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Abstract
This article presents a license model built with the intent of
accommodating varying motivations in creative projects involving
mass collaboration.
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I. Introduction: On the Precipice of Culture War or
Everyone is a Creative
It may belabor the obvious to say that the advent of the Internet
has had a tremendous impact on the way cultural content' is created,
disseminated, and consumed. That said, no conversation about
present day issues in the regulation of intellectual property, its
producers, and its consumers can be had without recognition of this
transformation and the resulting "shift in the logic by which culture
operates2 -a shift that blurs historically bright-line legal distinctions
regarding the who, what, and how of media. In the copyright context,
legal response to the changes arising from technological development
is predicated on a framework that, unfortunately, did not anticipate
the kind of individual access to the tools of creating and disseminating
content that the Internet brought.3 More specifically, it was not built
for a world in which "public" does not inherently indicate
commercial, or conversely, private amateur. It was not prepared for
the widespread amalgamation of materials and production of
bricolage, or "convergence culture"' that followed. The road thus far
1. The word "content" is used throughout this essay to indicate units of creative
information. This includes traditional media such as books, television, and movies, but
more to the point, includes new media divisions such as posts, entries, and webisodes.
2. HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA
COLLIDE (2006) [hereinafter CONVERGENCE CULTURE]. On his blog, Jenkins also
provides illustration that belies where this article is going:
[W]e've seen American television evolve over time between highly
episodic structures (more or less self-contained) to much more heavily
serialized structures. Most shows, though, combine elements of the
episodic (a procedural plot which can be wrapped up in a single episode)
and the serial (an evolving character relationship, an unfolding
mythology, a larger plot within which the individual episodes work as
chapters). The shift towards servility on American television plays a
large role in preparing audiences for transmedia storytelling. Most
transmedia stories are highly serial in structure, but not all serials are
transmedia.
Henry Jenkins, Transmedia 202: Further Reflections, CONFESSIONS OF AN ACA-FAN: THE
OFFICIAL WEBLOG OF HENRY JENKINS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://henryjenkins.org/2011/08/
defining-transmediafurther.html [hereinafter Transmedia 202].
3. Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-
Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 851 (2009).
4. Id.
5. CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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has left commercial authors and dilettantes in something of an
uneasy truce, where individuals infringing on commercial rights are
ignored until they seek to capitalize on their derivative works, while
commercial authors regularly appropriate dilettante content, often to
flash-in-the-pan protest followed by grudging acceptance of the new
*7terms of service.
Enter transmedia storytelling. Although the change is in its
infancy, academics" and industry professionals alike are coming to
recognize the positive potential of harnessing convergence culture
and dilettante enthusiasm, and are using this term to describe the
attempts.! The scope of what it means is still subject to debate," but
broadly, it is used to encompass any number of storytelling
mechanisms that share the following characteristics: (1) a fictional
6. This word will be used throughout the article to indicate those cultural
participants that commercial producers have long dismissed as passive recipients of
culture; at turns dubbed consumers, audiences, or users. It was selected for its neutrality
vis-A-vis the commercial-amateur dichotomy that pervades throughout copyright doctrine
and traditional thinking, as well as for its original, positive connotation indicating a love of
the arts.
7. Facebook is the perennial example of this phenomenon. For one example see C.
Walters, Facebook's New Terms of Service: "We Can Do Anything We Want With Your
Content. Forever.," CONSUMERIST (Feb. 15, 2009), http://www.consumerist.com/2009/02/
15/facebooks-new-terms-of-service-we-can-do-anything-we-want-with-your-content-forever/.
In at least one notable scenario, however, licensees managed to force a commercial actor
to retreat from a predatory term. See Alexandra Chang, Instagram User Numbers Down;
Updated Terms of Service in Effect This Week, WIRED (Jan. 15,2013), http://www.wired.com/
gadgetlab/2013/01/ instagram-terms-users/. This appears to be more of a too much, too
soon problem for Instagram than proof users would not stand for the policy over time.
8. For an introduction to academic discourse on the subject of dilettante participation,
see THE PARTICIPATORY CULTURES HANDBOOK (Aaron Delwiche & Jennifer Jacobs
Henderson eds., 2013).
9. Discussions of transmedia storytelling are now staged regularly. Among the largest
are the STORYWORLD CONFERENCE, www.storyworldconference.com (last visited Feb. 24,
2014), and TEDXTRANSMEDIA, www.tedxtransmedia.com (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
10. From Transmedia 202, supra note 2:
There is no transmedia formula. Transmedia refers to a set of choices
made about the best approach to tell a particular story to a particular
audience in a particular context depending on the particular resources
available to particular producers. The more we expand the definition,
the richer the range of options available to us can be. It doesn't mean we
expand transmedia to the point that anything and everything counts, but
it means we need a definition sophisticated enough to deal with a range
of very different examples. What I want to exclude from this definition is
'business as usual' projects which are not exploring the expanded
potential of transmedia, but are simply slapping a transmedia label on
the same old franchising practices we've seen for decades.
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universe or storyworld," (2) explored across multiple distribution
channels, (3) with narrative synchronization, (4) and, perhaps most
* * 12importantly, some degree of audience interactivity or participation.
Before going further, consider a few words on each element.
A "storyworld" or "universe" is defined by a set of rules, implicit
or explicit, that are enforced regardless of narrative or characters
employed. For example, a rule might be something like: characters
may acquire superpowers through genetic mutation but by no other
means.13 This rule would apply in a book that takes place in the
storyworld, as well as in a film that takes place in the storyworld, even
if the characters that appear in each work are completely different
and never interact.
This naturally leads to the multiple distribution channel element,
which is a deceptively simple in principle-while any individual work
(a film, a comic book) may be self-contained, the universe does not
end with that one work.14 So, hypothetically, within a storyworld
there might be a film trilogy that tells a simple epic, as well as a comic
book series that explores the film characters' origin stories, and a
videogame where players' missions involve delivering those
characters to their places at the start of the film." There is some
debate surrounding what "counts" as a distribution channel, such as
whether two or more mediums are required or merely two or more
related works, such that a film trilogy following the same narrative
would not count as transmedia, but a television series and comic
following the same narrative would.
Narrative synchronization requires that each individual
component contribute something unique to the storyworld as a
whole." This is perhaps most comprehensible in contrast to the
concept of franchise, which allows for rehashing the same familiar
characters and narratives ad nausem, sometimes with novel
11. While there are without a doubt possibilities for transmedia techniques to be
applied in the nonfiction and academic spheres, the scope of this article only addresses
fictional works and will thus leave this definitional element unexamined.
12. Transmedia 202, supra note 2.
13. This example is a rule of the X-Men series owned by Marvel Comics.
14. See e.g. Buffy the Vampire Slayer (Mutant Enemy Productions 1997-2003)
television show, Angel (Mutant Enemy Productionsl999-2004) television show, and comic
book Buffy the Vampire Slayer Season Eight (Dark Horse 2007-2011).
15. See e.g. Resident Evil Outbreak (Capcom Production Studio 1 2013) as it relates to
Resident Evil 2 (Capcom 1998) and Resident Evil 3: Nemesis (Capcom 1999), or the Marvel
Comics prologue comic (1997) packaged with the original Resident Evil game.
16. Transmedia 202, supra note 2.
17. Transmedia 202, supra note 2.
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reimagining of motifs that define the property, but that do not
contribute new plotlines or characters. For example, the content of
the Lord of the Rings film trilogy" is more or less the same as the
content of the books." Superheroes are a great example of the
bounds of franchise behavior. One recently abused protagonist is
Spiderman, whose origin story has been rebooted twice in the last
decade." Although new characters and plotlines appear, they act
more like alternatives to each other rather than one complete story.
In contrast, the content of the Matrix film trilogy21 is different from
the content of the Animatrix animated series of shorts,22 but the
stories in each series are interwoven. This is indicative of transmedia
storytelling.
The fourth, final, and focal element for this article is audience
participation.23 The invitation of large numbers of dilettantes to have
an impact on the shape of ostensibly commercial ventures is new and
unique to transmedia storytelling. Participation, of course, exists on a
spectrum, where at its most basic it might consist of little more than
finding the disparate components of a completely formed product.24
A higher level of participation might look something like a Choose
Your Own Adventure,2 5 only the elements of the project change based
on participation from a temporally synchronized audience. The
logical far end of the spectrum is widespread collaborative
storytelling, wherein a participant is at once an author and an
audience member, both contributing to a narrative and subject to the
decisions of others within that narrative.
This idea of incorporating the efforts of people traditionally
relegated to the role of consumer precipitates a paradigm shift.
Copyright law supposes a cogent entity, regardless as to whether
18. THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING (New Line Cinema
2003); THE LORD OF THE RINGS: THE TWO TOWERS (New Line Cinema 2002); THE
LORD OF THE RINGS: THE RETURN OF THE KING (New Line Cinema 2003).
19. J.R.R. TOLKEIN, THE LORD OF THE RINGS (1955).
20. SPIDER-MAN (Sony 2002); THE AMAZING SPIDER-MAN (Sony 2012).
21. THE MATRIX (Warner Brothers 1999); THE MATRIX RELOADED (Warner
Brothers 2003); THE MATRIX REVOLUTIONS (Warner Brothers 2003).
22. THE ANIMATRIX (Village Road Show 2003).
23. In Transmedia 202, supra note 2, Henry Jenkins also discusses the difference
between participation and interactivity. While not particularly relevant here, it is of
importance for a nuanced understanding of transmedia storytelling.
24. See e.g. THE LIZZIE BENNET DIARIES, http://www.izziebennet.com/ (last visited Feb.
24,2014).
25. Series published exclusively by Chooseco, LLC, see CHOOSE YOUR OWN
ADVENTURE, http://www.cyoa.com/ (last updated Feb. 29, 2014).
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singular or joint, that can make unilateral decisions about a work, and
this entity is referred to as the author or the copyright holder of that
work. As Andrea Phillips put it, perhaps more to the point:
At the end of the day, the core owner of the property in
question is the one with the power to choose who profits and
how much, or what becomes canon and what doesn't, and can
pull the rug out from under the population of fans-turned-
spec-creators at any time.
What happens at that logical end of the spectrum then, when this
control is atomized over those fans-turned-spec-creators, and an
unprecedented number of people with varying opinions and
indecipherable contributions have some nonnegligible say about a
work? In the commercial media context, elevating dilettante
participants into authorship can be as alarming as it is alluring, as
losing control of that work may be tantamount to losing its
profitability. From a dilettante perspective, commercial attempts to
exercise control over something perceived to be owned by the culture
that created it is equally problematic." In order to address this
tension, consider a hypothetical:
Imagine a storyworld where there is no individual entity in
charge. The closest analog would come in the form of moderators or
curators; people who enforce a set of universe rules but have no more
authority over the cannon than anyone else. This storyworld would
be in a sense both a democracy and an anarchy; the former because
the people decide rules to follow together, the latter because there is
no one dictating those rules. Moderators may come and go with time,
be "elevated" in by other moderators and perhaps in exchange barred
from excessive submission to the collaboration to prevent any one
person from becoming an overtly controlling author. Cannon' in this
hypothetical would be determined by the number of up votes a given
submission gets by members of the participating online community.
The participatory element can vary; if a visitor only wants to follow
the story and up or down vote, but not contribute, there is a way to do
26. Andrea Phillips, Why I Hate "Value Co-Creation," DEUS EX MACHINATIO (Dec. 6,
2011), http://www.deusexmachinatio.com/blog/2011/12/6/why-i-hate-value-co-creation.html.
27. A recent example of cultural appropriation gone awry: Adolfo Flores, Disney
withdraws Trademark Filing for "Dia de los Muertos," L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/08/entertainment/la-et-ct-disney-dia-de-los-muertos-
20130507.
28. Cannon in the fan community is used to differentiate the purported real story from fan
works.
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that, too. Remember, transmedia storytelling need not entail this
kind of mass collaboration, but mass collaboration at this point in
time will by practical necessity end up being transmedia. The
storyworld allows for a timeline where alternative universes can spin
off and stub or reconnect with the main narrative later.29
Now imagine that a major film company wants to license the right
to make a feature film based on this collaborative production, either as
a franchise or as an addition to the existing narrative. Who is in a
position to negotiate a license with the production company? And
perhaps the question most relevant to commercial media: who pays,
who gets paid, and for what?
The aim of this article is to posit a solution, grounded in legal
realism, for the practical issues that arise when copyright law and
content monetizers encounter a work (or perhaps more accurately, a
series of interdependent works) with an unprecedented number of
people who could ostensibly assert authorship over some element of
the content. In order to have a cogent discussion about mass
collaboration in storytelling, Part II of this article will outline in
greater depth the history of how the commercial-dilettante relations
question has been addressed in comparable contexts. Once the
scenarios are established, they will be followed with something of a
comparative analysis, looking at how the solutions employed there
might be applied to mass collaboration. This will also help to define,
by contrast, the scope of transmedia storytelling and the ways in
which mass collaboration presents new challenges. Part III will posit
a structure for projects involving mass collaboration, geared toward
inclusion of commercial media producers, with an eye toward
anticipating and circumventing the issues identified in the preceding
section. Rather than reinvent the wheel, Part III will explain how,
through careful blend of existing systems, content monetizers already
have the tools necessary to establish an equitable balance of authorial
power across all types of participants in a collaborative storyworld. If
done correctly, dilettantes will be more passionately dedicated to and
immersed in content than ever before, while the financially motivated
will still be able to profit from their efforts.
29. Lest this appear to be no more than a thought experiment, an example of a
project that comes tantalizingly close to the fact pattern introduced in this article can be
found at HIT RECORD, www.hitrecord.org (last updated Feb. 25, 2014).
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II. The Producer-Consumer Dichotomy:
An Exploration of Existing Systems
Perhaps due to no more than an absence of foresight, history has
created a class distinction between those who produce and those who
consume. This is beginning to erode. Because copyright was
designed with the commercial, rather than individual, cultural
participant in mind," there has been significant and not entirely
unpredictable public rejection of its application in an environment
propelled by individuals, namely to dilettantes in the digital sphere.31
Two things have happened. First, in place of an effective and
enforceable legal regime, so called Web 2.0 has effectuated social
norms where some forms of infringement, while recognized as such,
are ignored or even condoned by professional authors, and others are
not." In other words, copyright supposes that there are people who
produce and people who consume, but in practice sometimes those
relegated to the role of consumer are able to make and win a tacit
case from the bottom-up for stunted authorship rights in their
derivative works.33 Second, there is also a top-down response: in
some instances, original authors are even attempting to foil the
system through contracting around provisions that exclude others
from participation and development of their copyrightable work.'
The hypothetical posed in Part I is designed specifically to
illustrate a case where this legitimate versus tolerated versus
illegitimate paradigm is moot by virtue of eliminating the cogent,
central copyright owner. While recognizing that, the purpose of Part
II is to understand massive and/or dilettante authorship in the context
that such work is generally regarded, (first by the law and second in
cultural practice), and to examine ways in which authors with
comparable desires have addressed the problem in their own contexts.
Part II is also edifying in the discussion of mass collaboration because it
helps to define mass collaboration in storytelling by illustrating what
stands in contrast, i.e., that it is not perfectly analogous to any cases
discussed below, however comparable they may be in some regards.
30. Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459
(2008).
31. Gervais, supra note 3, at 853.
32. Lee, supra note 30, at 1461.
33. See generally that www.fanfiction.net is up and running.
34. See generally CREATIVE COMMONS, www.creativecommons.org (last visited Feb.
24, 2014).
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These ideas that have been subject to legal discussion will be
analyzed in three groups: the traditional legal doctrine that touches on
collaboration (joint authorship) and inordinate size (compulsory
licensing) in Section A; the stop-gap cultural practices (treatment of
fanfiction and other kinds of user-generated content) in Section B; and
finally, areas where work around contracts have been developed (open
source software, Creative Commons licenses) in Section C. The
proffered solution to the unique challenges of mass collaboration will be
built on the lessons learned from each of these examples.
A. Controlling Doctrine
The law has considered both the idea of creative collaboration
and the idea that there can be enough copyright holders requiring
consultation (in order to accomplish a distribution task) as to render
individual negotiation impracticable-the nominative issues in mass
collaboration. This section briefly examines how the Part I
hypothetical might benefit from an understanding of these premises.
1. Joint Authorship.
Joint authorship is a concept familiar to copyright scholars;
indeed, it is a building block of the copyright regime. Still and yet, it
is fraught with philosophical questions about the intent of the parties
in creating a work, the degree of collaboration between them, the
threshold for originality, and reconciling inconsistent tests across
courts."
While this is informative in a cursory, sweeping sense, and while it
would be remiss to leave this entry point to a discussion of
collaboration in the eyes of the law unacknowledged, scholarship and
case law on joint authorship vastly deal with disputes between at most
a handful of individuals.3 Thus, a deep analysis does not provide
much insight for mass collaboration except in as much as it shows
clear evidence that the courts are ill prepared to address potentially
thousands of joint authors in tens of jurisdictions when they have
difficulty evaluating even two such collaborators in a consistent
manner.37
35. See Lior Zemer, Is Intention to Co-Author an Uncertain Realm of Policy?, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 611, 616 (2007).
36. Id.
37. See Russ Ver Steeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68
BROOK. L. REV. 123,126 (2002).
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2. Compulsory Licensing.
The law has also attempted to address the issue of negotiating
with multiple rights holders through compulsory licensing, although it
should be distinguished that this solution does not address rights
holders in mass collaboration with each other. Compulsory licensing
allows a party seeking to use another's intellectual property to do so,
without first seeking the copyright holder's consent, for a set fee.'
This scheme stems from the 1909 Copyright Act and exists in
modified form today. Historically the United States has only issued
compulsory licenses for copyrighted materials in cases particularly
geared toward widespread public consumption, such as radio
broadcast." The terms of the license are subject to negotiation
between the content owner and the entity seeking to distribute, but in
some cases elements are determined by a division of the Copyright
Office.' The most comparable application of compulsory licensing is
in the context of music. There, the system is effectuated by
performance rights organizations such as The American Society of
Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music,
Inc. ("BMI"), and The Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers ("SESAC"), which collect and distribute royalties to
copyright holders.41
Compulsory licensing is informative to mass collaboration
because it is as close as major industry actors have come to a system
in which use without prior permission is acceptable.
B. Social Systems
Whether due to backlash or the pure inefficacy of the copyright
regime,42 social customs have emerged surrounding dilettante
creativity in the shadow of commercial endeavors. 43  Although
38. Jeffery A. Wakolbinger, Note, Compositions Are Being Sold for a Song: Proposed
Legislation and New Licensing Opportunities Demonstrate the Unfairness of Compulsory
Licensing to Owners of Musical Compositions, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 803,810 (2008).
39. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73: COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING
AND DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS (U.S. Gov'T PRINTING OFFICE 2011).
40. Id.
41. See generally Repost-ASCAP, BMI & SESAC: What's the Difference?,
SONGTRUST, http://blog.songtrust.com/songwriting-tips/pros-whats-the-difference/ (last
visited Mar. 31, 2014).
42. A discussion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the subsequent debate
is beyond the scope of this paper. See 17 U.S.C. § 101, (2008).
43. Leanne Stendell, Fanfic and Fan Fact: How Current Copyright Law Ignores the
Reality of Copyright Owner and Consumer Interests in Fan Fiction, 58 SMU L. REV. 1551,
1552 (2005).
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infringement is not per se an issue for the Part I hypothetical, many of
the ownership issues surrounding dilettante works are highlighted by
the social customs adopted in light of fanfiction. Appropriation of
dilettante practices for work prepared by a commercial author is
highlighted by the licensing customs surrounding user-generated
content.
1. Fanfiction.
Fanfiction is the popular name given to a large class of derivative
works" that routinely4 5 arise under these circumstances: (1) the
underlying work is (a) prepared commercially and (b) still protected
by copyright, while (2) the derivative work (a) does not generate
profit," (b) is unauthorized by the copyright holder, and (c) is
digitally self-published. 47 Like so many practices once relegated into
obscurity," the advent of the Internet brought fanfiction to the fore of
both popular culture consumption habits49 and copyright litigation,
winning the vitriol of a number of prominent authorso and losing as
many matters in the courts." Despite this, and in keeping with
conjecture of a bottom-up negotiation between the public and the law
discussed about, the practice continues to thrive. One well
established hub, fanfiction.net, boasted over 3.3 million stories when
calculated in 2010,52 a number that has grown every day since."
Legal address of the fanfiction debate today is characterized by
scholars calling for a fair use exemption as a means of allowing the
44. Id.
45. A discussion of the nuances in defining what constitutes fanfiction is also beyond
the scope of this paper. Here, it will be used to describe all works that could ostensibly be
included in the definition as provided.
46. Casey Fiesler, Note, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How
Existing Social Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content,
10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 729, 731-32 (2008).
47. Stendell, supra note 43, at 1552-53. It is also worth noting that self-publication
predates the digital era, although no longer common practice.
48. Fiesler, supra note 46, at 736.
49. Id. at 734.
50. See Chris Meadows, Novelist Diana Gabaldon Causes Fanfic Furor, TELEREAD
(May 5, 2010), www.teleread.com/copy-right/novelist-diana-gabaldon-causes-fanfic-furor/.
51. The most prominent and perhaps most bitter of these is the Harry Potter
lexicographer. See Anemona Hartocollis, Sued by Harry Potter's Creator, Lexicographer
Breaks Down on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/16/
nyregion/16potter.html?_r=0/.
52. Charles Sendlor, FanFiction.Net Member Statistics, FFN RESEARCH (July 18,
2010), http://ffnresearch.blogspot.com/2010/07/fanfictionnet-users.html.
53. See generally FAN FICTION, https://www.fanfiction.net/ (last visisted Mar. 31,
2014).
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practice to continue under the existing copyright regime5 against
copyright traditionalists, largely content monetizers and their
licensees, condemning the practice based squarely on the fact that,
currently, there is no such exemption." Interestingly, the issue has
come to a head in a handful of incidents where the facts more or less
are these: a copyright owner discovers public interest in a dilettante's
derivative work. The owner recreates the work and mass-produces it
for public purchase. The owner subsequently shuts down the
dilettante operation that precipitated an interest in monetization."
For purposes of the Part I hypothetical, this serves to highlight a
critical flaw in the copyright regime that favors the commercial; an
underlying rights holder can infringe on the original elements of a
derivative work when the author of the derivative work is not itself a
commercial actor, i.e., when it favors the monetizer, it is perfectly
acceptable to adopt the very practice it condemns by the dilettante.
This demonstrates how easy it would be for the hypothetical film studio
to take advantage of the dilettante authors' work under current
normative practices.
While a wary social tolerance for fanfiction may be a good
temporary solution in the case of dilettante-authored derivative
works, it is of little use in the mass collaboration context.
Fundamental to the Part I hypothetical is a premise that content
protectable under the copyright regime is accessible to anyone who
wants to contribute, as is the case with open source software. What is
most informative about fanfiction is what happens when commercial
interest reasserts itself in the milieu. Even if the actions are facially
legal, public opinion falls squarely in favor of dilettantes. 7 If it is to
succeed with the public, any solution in the mass collaboration
context must take this power problem into account.
2. User-generated Content
User-generated content ("UGC"), like transmedia, is a
"conceptual cloud"" of a term meant to indicate a number of
different activities dilettantes engage in online, which, by some
54. See generally Rachel L. Stroude, Complimentary Creation: Protecting Fan Fiction
as Fair Use, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 191 (2010).
55. Needs citation.
56. For a recent example, see Ellie Hall, "Firefly" Hat Triggers Corporate
Crackdown, BUZZFEED (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ellievhall/firefly-hat-
triggers-corporate-crackdown.
57. Id.
58. Gervais, supra note 3, at 843.
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definitions, may include both fanfiction and mass collaboration. A
broad definition can be made by breaking the term down into its
individual components: content is information, and a user is a type of
content creator or author whose works emerge in a digital
environment." Of course the word "user" is another iteration of the
same creator-consumer dichotomy discussed above, and is
particularly problematic where content is creative information rather
than factual in nature. It may be worth noting in the UGC context
that even professional artists are "users" of programs that come with
a license, but there is a discrepancy in treatment. For example, when
Adobe Systems released the first edition of Photoshop in 1989 for
professional use,' it would not have considered that it might be able
to acquire the ownership rights of all images that resulted from a
professional photographer's use of the program to manipulate a raw
file-commercial authors would never have used a product that
divested them of the ability to capitalize their own work. By contrast,
that same photographer using Instagram to edit and post a photo, i.e.,
acting in a dilettante capacity, would have the same "user" status, and
consequently limited rights," afforded to anyone who uploads a
photo, with no regard for her expertise. In both contexts the
photographer is a "user" creating new content with professional
abilities, but the license for software meant to be used professionally
versus that meant to be used casually changes the way she is viewed
by fellow monetizers. This only throws the same fundamental
discrepancy in treatment of dilettantes versus treatment of
commercial producers seen in fanfiction into sharper relief.
To narrow the scope of the discussion in an attempt to find
something more, UGC in the creative or storyworld context generally
refers to a commercial, professionally manufactured world or
program where dilettantes can come in and create within given
parameters.62 This can be as simple as moderated posts on a forum
and as complex as virtual realities. The latter largely follow
traditional gaming rules, as in the case of World of Warcraft, where
dilettantes' participation is limited to elements like character design,
59. Greg Lastowka, User-Generated Content and Virtual Worlds, 10 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 893, 895 (2008).
60. The History of Photoshop, COMPUTER ARTS (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.creative
bloq.com/adobe/history-photoshop-12052724.
61. For the present Instagram terms of service, see Instagram Terms of Use (Jan. 19,
2013), http://www.instagram.com/legal/terms.
62. Lastowka, supra note 59.
PARTICIPATORY MEDIA PRODUCTIONS20141 395
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
and they play professionally planned stories. There are, however,
some notable exceptions.
The most extreme example of dilettante participation in a virtual
world context, and perhaps most comparable to premise of mass
collaboration in transmedia storytelling, is the UGC parameters of
the game Second Life.63 In this virtual reality, there is comparatively
little design or planning by the nominative owner." Instead, the
framework for building avatars and the digital building blocks for
items are provided, but dilettantes are left to their own devices to
create with the tools at their disposal. Individual creations can
actually be bought and sold for real currency." In some respects it
might be more comparable to a chat room than a true storyworld, and
to that end it is distinguishable on the basis of story arc. In order to
achieve the creative community that it does, Second Life loses its
potential for any centralized storytelling element.
Unlike the tacit agreements that govern fanfiction or the daisy
chain licenses that follow open source software (discussed below),
however, UGC in creative contexts are almost unilaterally governed
by end user license agreements ("EULAs") that click away rights the
dilettante would otherwise enjoy. In some cases this includes
granting the licensor the right to monetize the dilettante's content."
The treatment of creative UGC should sound like a warning to
anyone intending to collaborate in dilettante-fueled media. From the
licensor perspective, EULAs can only go so far as the four corners of
the world they govern, be it a website, a program, or an application.
If transmedia storytelling requires fluidity across media, this means
that the moment the storyworld leaves its first context, so too go the
rules of the controlling EULA. Once that happens, the licensor must
resort to the same tactics used in fanfiction, because copyright
infringement becomes the only leg left on which to stand. From the
licensee perspective, EULAs are also daunting, in part because the
terms vary so greatly between licensors, and in part because the
bargaining power is unilaterally on the side of the licensor. A
workable solution in mass collaboration will have to account for the
lack of platform boundary and the power discrepancy in UGC.
63. Id.
64. What is Second Life?, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/whatis/?lang=en-US
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
65. Shopping in Second Life, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/shop/?Iang=en-US
(last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
66. See Walters, supra note 7.
396 [36.2
C. The Free Culture Response
As demonstrated in their analysis, the methods described in
Section B are by no means satisfactory solutions for all cases. The
free culture movement, championed by Lawrence Lessig, seeks to
promote public access to creative works, rejecting the need for
permission espoused by copyright law.67 To this end, there have been
some notable attempts by non-profit organizations to provide clear
structure and rules pursuant to copyright law that allow authors to
intentionally adopt free culture maxims. They do this by way of
blanket licenses that follow the work. The goal can be seen narrowly
as substituting in a contract for standard issue copyright doctrine to
better meet public needs-in other words, to open access to material
that could otherwise be copyrighted and subsequently stifle use or
collaboration. This section will look at two scenarios in which authors
have intentionally foregone their rights in order to allow for wider
dissemination of their works and creation of new, derivative works.
1. Open Source Software
The Open Source Initiative has offered a comprehensive
definition of what constitutes open source software. In brief, it must:
be free to redistribute; include access to the source code; allow
derivative works; and not discriminate against persons, groups, or
fields of endeavori6 The software license must: (1) be technology
neutral, (2) not be tied to a specific product, (3) not restrict other
software, and (4) apply to anyone to whom it is redistributed.69 While
there are a couple of alternatives, most open source software is
governed by the GNU Project's General Public License, the basic
purpose of which is to ensure that all code licensed under it remains
accessible for anyone who wants to see or modify it.'o The primary
legal concern in the open source space is the enforceability of such a
license should an author wish to redact the initial license, although
courts have ruled that a lack of monetary compensation or royalty
payment does not impact enforceability."
Although transmedia storytelling is clearly not software (or at
least not limited to the confines of a single software), the implications
67. FREE CULTURE FOUNDATION, http://www.freeculture.org (last visited Mar. 31,2014).
68. For the full definition, see The Open Source Definition, OPEN SOURCE
INITIATIVE, http://opensource.orglosd (last updated Feb. 25, 2014).
69. Id.
70. Kerry D. Goettsch, Recent Developments, SCO Group v. IBM: The Future of
Open-Source Software, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 581, 582 (2003).
71. Id.
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for mass collaboration in a creative context here are staggering, most
notably in that open source is a similarly deliberate break from the
standard vesting copyright. The one overwhelming difference that
would need to be accounted for is, of course, monetization,72 which
both commercial copyright holders and dilettantes have some interest
in; the former because their businesses are predicated on making
money from creative endeavors, and the latter because even small
projects can have material costs associated that individuals may seek
to recoup or derive comparatively small profits from.
2. Creative Commons
In a similar, although comparatively loose vein, Creative
Commons licenses are gaining popularity with creators who wish to
default to "some rights reserved" rather than copyright's standard
"all rights reserved."" Creative Commons is a tax-exempt charitable
corporation that provides standardized blanket licenses such that
content creators can voluntarily waive selected rights.74 Creative
Commons currently offers six license variations that are binding on
each new user depending on whether the licensor wants to allow
modifications or commercial use." The closest license, called the
Attribution-ShareAlike Unported License, allows for commercial use
and modification so long as the commercial user does not impede
access for anyone else who wants to use or modify the work."
However, there are currently no Creative Commons licenses that
incorporate a royalty or other compensation for the owner of the
underlying work.
This model is also highly promising for application in the mass
collaboration context. It differs from software licensing in two
notable ways. First, it expands the application of "daisy chain"
licensing to works that are less functional in nature than code." And
second, it is more purely elective, because authors can select how
72. See infra Part III for why monetization is still a concern here despite the efforts of
the free culture movement.
73. See for example flickr, which allows users to select a CC license in uploading or to
search content filtered by type of CC license. FLICKR, https://www.flickr.com/ (last visited
Mar. 31, 2014).
74. Ashley West, Little Victories- Promoting Artistic Progress Through the Enforcement of
Creative Commons Attribution and Share-Alike Licenses, 36 FLA. ST. U. L REV. 903,904 (2009).
75. See About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://www.creativecommons.org/
licenses (last updated Feb. 25, 2014) for the full list of Creative Commons licenses.
76. Id.
77. A daisy chain license binds a signatory to distributing derivative content under
the same terms it agreed to in acquiring rights.
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many of their rights to their original works they wish to license away.
It is also interesting for mass collaboration to note the differences in
scenario: In software there seem to be a relatively small number of
works with many collaborators, whereas with Creative Commons, the
licenses are attached to a large number of works that may not be
repeatedly revisited for building and revision. In that sense, mass
collaboration is probably more comparable to open source software,
but needs to retain some of the rights in the mode of Creative
Commons to prevent commercial abuse. The overarching lesson here
is that such daisy chain licenses can work in both ways, and the trick
will be to apply them in a way that is simultaneously conducive to the
propagation of software style collaborative hubs, without stepping on
the rights of smaller, disparate stubs.
Although the foregoing approaches are neither precisely on point
for purposes of confronting issues in mass collaboration nor by any
means bereft of their own quandaries, they are informative for the
development of a practical framework for producers aiming to
incorporate a participatory element into their projects. At the most
basic level, this background demonstrates that companies need to be
mindful of the way they approach crowd-sourced materials in order to
preempt extensive snares in the creative process. What constitutes
mindful design, of course, will depend on the scope of participation.
III. Modeling Ownership in Mass Collaboration
In drafting a solution for the problems of mass collaboration in
transmedia storytelling, the foregoing overview of comparable
scenarios provides a great deal of insight. There are both lessons
appropriate to confront some elements, as well as fundamental issues
with each of the approaches should they be used alone. First, the
overview demonstrates that the statutory underpinnings for
massiveness and collaboration are woefully inadequate when the two
elements are combined. Second, it demonstrates how passive
solutions in the form of tacit, widespread, bottom up negotiation lead
to anger and confusion on behalf of cultural participants the moment
money becomes a consideration. Finally, it demonstrates that a
license-based work around has the potential to be highly effective if
structured appropriately. Part III will attempt to synthesize the
effective components of each example and avoid the noted pitfalls to
provide a working model for mass collaboration in transmedia
storytelling.
Where collaboration is tantamount to production, as in the Part I
hypothetical, litigation is not a workable option. The legal process of
2014]
PARTICIPATORY MEDIA PRODUCTIONS 399
allocating liquid assets to potentially thousands of dilettante
participants through litigation would consume at the very least time,
and in most instances would also bear significant legal or
administrative cost. These realities may very well unduly constrain
creative efforts, and, in the worst case, be prohibitively impractical"
for a given project. Where avoiding litigation is key to the success of
a creative endeavor, any system developed must take into account the
interests that might otherwise motivate legal action. In other words,
the goals of the framework must be in line with the goals of the
participants, whether commercial or dilettante, as well as those of the
copyright regime.
By now it must be overwhelmingly clear that the system advocated
in this article will incorporate payment for the creative input of all
authors, even if this is motivated solely by a desire to address the
interests of commercial participants. Based on a recurring
conversation in copyright at large, it is predictable that choosing to
include payment at all will meet some criticism. The copyright regime
in place today is predicated on the notion that in order to achieve great
works, authors must be fiscally incentivized. 9 Proponents of the system
argue that authors should be compensated for the value they add to
society and that no one would chose to become a professional author if
the attendant compensation is meager or nonexistent, and also that the
artistic value of the works will increase with this incentive.' The
regime has plenty of notable and vocal critics, who argue in varying
ways that money is not a necessary motivator-even for
professionals-or, if accepting the premise that it is, that there are ways
to monetize without barriers to access to the work (e.g., advertising
revenue or charging for attendant services rather than relying on copy
purchases or subscriptions)." For regime proponents, the undeniable
success of open source software despite its being free is something of
an elephant in the room.
For regime opponents, the high number of layoffs in the
entertainment industry, at the very least attributed to decreased
revenue at the hands of internet piracy, serves as a similar
counterexample." Regardless of what the answer should be, the reality
78. That is, if a producer does not have the resources to address all participants using
the legal system.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
80. E.g. THE AUTHORS GUILD, http://www.authorsguild.org (Mar. 31,2014).
81. See e.g., Richard Stallman, The GNU Manifesto, GNU (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://www.gnu.org/gnu manifesto.html.
82. CREATIVE FUTURE, http://www.creativefuture.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
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is that the current copyright regime does embrace financially-motivated
creative activity. Furthermore, in an industry that has long suffered
from an identity crisis surrounding the valuation of labor, a regime that
does not allow for profit would be wildly unpopular-and if part of the
effort here is to create a more equitable, realistic, and holistic solution,
then some accommodation must be made for commercial producers.
In short, if the proposed system for governing mass collaboration is to
address the interests of all participants, this means addressing the
interests of monetizers as much as it does dilettantes, and, thus, will
strive for the flexibility needed to accommodate both perspectives.
Satisfying dilettante participants will largely be predicated on
interest in facts and fairness."' Facts in this context are pieces of real,
concrete information about the rules of participation and the fate of
the project to the extent commercial authors participate. While there
are certainly differing notions of what should be included and what
should be externalized in a calculation of fairness, commonly desired
indicia include, inter alia: credit for work; some degree of control over
what happens to a given contribution once it is made publically
available;' continued access to the project and any attendant
endeavors if and when commercial authors become involved; and,
where money is a concern, adequate compensation relative to the
contribution.8 ' A point that must be impressed here is that the
traditional methods of incentivizing or placating fans will not work for
compensating dilettantes. Donating money or competing to win a
walk-on role in a feature is inadequate because it fails to address the
dilletante as a co-creator. The bottom line is that any individual
component of the project that makes money must share profits with
the community. From a practical perspective, ease of process in
implementing a fair system is also relevant to dilettantes, who may
not be interested in the legal labor required to meet these desires."
Finally, the government is, in a sense, an interested party in
publically created works as well. However misguided or ineffective
its legal progeny may be in this case, copyright was created with the
83. This assertion is based on the negative reactions of fans in many of the articles
relied on for this article when these two components were deemed missing in a given
scenario.
84. The solution will address the issue for U.S. participants without getting into a
discussion of foreign copyright(s) or moral rights.
85. Most of these are obviated by the Creative Commons solutions discussed in Part II.
86. For a discussion of the psychological barriers to use of the legal tools available to
a person, see Stanley L. Brodsky, Carroll M. Brodsky, Sarah H. Wolking, Why People
Don't Sue: A Conceptual and Applied Exploration of Decisions Not to Pursue Litigation,
32 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 273 (2004).
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benefit of the public in mind through promotion of the arts.Y Any
solution must take into account this fundamental tenet of the system
of the legal grounds on which it rests.
Bearing these interests in mind, the remainder of Part III will
outline the proposed solution in Section A and will go on to explain
how it meets the goals delineated here in Section B.
A. Proposal: The Share-Commerce License
In order to meet the divergent interests of participating parties,
this article proposes content producers initiate projects involving
mass collaboration under the following system, to be called a share-
commerce license: first, create a daisy chain license, similar to those
drafted by Creative Commons and GNU. Second, ensure that it
contains both a compulsory royalty element and an Attribution
ShareAlike element, such that all new participants are bound by the
same terms and such any monetizing entity must put some portion of
profits back into the community. Ideally this license would also cover
the way in which participants could collect or assign royalties. Third,
make the license available through a nonprofit organization,
preferably one with some administrative capability such that royalty
funds can be easily redistributed to participants. Details of the vision
for each element will be addressed in turn.
The share-commerce license proposed here blends the idea of
compulsory licensing with the idea of Creative Commons or GNU
daisy chain licensing. Like the Creative Commons Attribution-
ShareAlike license, anyone can contribute under the exact terms of
the license of all precedent work. The daisy chain license forms the
basic relationship between all participants such that anyone
introducing a new participant into the system via sharing inherently
also passes on the license. Participants are incentivized to declare
themselves as such if they want to receive the attendant financial
benefits. If they are disinterested, their content is still free to exist
until and unless they seek to monetize it, at which point the
compulsory royalty component would be activated.
The compulsory royalty element, derived from compulsory
licensing by the government, would need to be structured in a way
that is neither prohibitively expensive for dilettantes nor meaningless
for high revenue projects. The license itself is inherently already
compulsory under the daisy chain terms. Where an individual
participant seeks to monetize, either a percentage of the proposed
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
402 [36.2
budget or a percentage of profits would be due back to the
community. This is not unlike a common practice in the existing
entertainment industry of compensating key participants with royalty
points that lead to residual checks, so the infrastructure for major
commercial participants is already in place. One consideration might
be a cost-contingent schematic such that, for example, a participant
who wants to make t-shirts with an initial investment of two thousand
dollars need only contribute a small, one time royalty, where as a film
production with a two hundred thousand dollar budget would owe
royalties from profits.
The non-profit organization element need not be specific to a
project. It only needs to be able to manage royalty revenue.
Potential recipients of residuals could either chose to receive a check,
to donate to another cause, or to have the money go into the
nonprofit organization's overhead. There might even be a way for
participants to allocate earned royalties to others in need of startup
funds to make a new contribution to the project. Alternatively, all
proceeds could be directed toward the 501(C)(3) and producer-
participants could apply for funding that would be directed back
toward the project.
For the share-commerce license to function, collaborators should
be treated like a class rather than as individuals. There is already
significant legal precedent for class action and settlement. Thus
anyone who participated in the project can be contacted and funds
can be either paid out or collected for overhead costs, which
otherwise should be borne by the monetizer.
B. Why the Share-Commerce License
The share-commerce license addresses the interests laid out at the
beginning of Part II in several respects, but most importantly for the
copyright discussion it structures the relationships between
participants in a way that is fair and not terribly radical or unfamiliar
to the relevant parties.
First, it addresses the primary commercial interest of flexibility
with regard to monetization. The share-commerce license allows
anyone who wants to profit to do so, including the initial producer,
but not without paying some portion back into the collective. At the
same time, it allows dilettantes to continue to contribute without fear
of either the project or their individual ideas being capitalized without
some recognition, quashing two potential sources of litigation. The
dilettante also is afforded an opportunity to elect to profit as the
community profits, even if this is ultimately only pennies or is
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processed as a donation. If dilettantes do not have an interest in their
individual apportionment, it is amortized across the rest of the
population. At the same time, this system allows the monetizing
production to keep the majority of its profits while compensating
individual achievement.
Second, the share-commerce license addresses dilettante interests
in facts and fairness. The rules are simple and easy to adopt; all
dilettantes must do is participate in order to be governed by the
license, and unless they seek to be included in the monetary
component by virtue of capitalizing on their contributions to the
project, the only time they would need to think about money is if they
have specific interest acquiring or assigning their apportioned
royalties somewhere specific. Otherwise the non-profit organization
can allocate unclaimed funds.
The interests of copyright are protected because all authors within
the system are able to proliferate their works as they see fit, and, to
the extent that they are incentivized by profit, they are able to
capitalize accordingly.
The class treatment and compulsory elements are useful in
meeting all participants' goals surrounding access to content and
ability to create works by addressing the issues of speed and
simplicity. These elements also preempt the possibility of a small
minority of contributors potentially stemming the creative efforts of
others in any of the ways outlined in Part II. In other words, the class
of dilettantes who collectively own the intellectual property generated
in the hypothetical would be compelled to license to the film studio
for a set fee, and the class of commercial participants would be
required to allow dilettante participants to continue to use what they
might otherwise copyright. This also ensures that contributors are
compensated at some level, however minimal that fraction of the total
license price may be ultimately.
IV. Conclusion
As transmedia storytelling and the invitation for public
participation in creative endeavors become more prevalent, it is
imperative that industry and law make careful decisions about
intellectual property rights management. While the system outlined
here is promising as a preemptive measure against problems in mass
collaboration, a number of questions are left unaddressed.
The most pressing issue remaining is manageable enforcement.
Regardless of the proposed solution, ultimately there will come a day
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when a participant will have cause to litigate in mass collaboration
project, and plenty of small-scale dilettante monetizers will
intentionally or unintentionally fail to pay into a system that is not
monitored. The idea here is to keep these projects as far from court
as possible and it does not address what happens should best efforts
fail. The article also does not address legality issues surrounding
daisy chain licenses. Some discussion is starting to emerge about such
contracts having the effect of binding third parties, which would bode
poorly for the proposed model. It remains yet to be seen if this
elegant solution will be quashed in its infancy. Another major
unaddressed issue is the inherent waiver of moral rights, which in
some counties are inalienable, and complicates the equation for
international participants subject to such laws.
The share-commerce license is still more stable than a void, which
is what exists now for fanfiction and original UGC, or using models
that were not built for intentional mass collaboration, like standard
issue joint authorship or compulsory licensing. The license idea is
meant to be something producers can modify through careful drafting
as needed to retain rights in core elements of a property, or for
internally produced products with lesser degrees of participation from
external collaborators who still might have some important creative
input. In other words, the share-commerce license idea is a start that
must be built upon through experimentation. Hopefully this article
also serves as a point for greater discussion in the academic community
about the intersection of law and collaborative creativity such that
smart, fair choices can be made without relying on the courts or
interested parties to dictate the rules of engagement.
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